No-Fault: Pure, Partial or Paltry by Davies, Jack
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 2 Winter 1972 Article 9 
1972 
No-Fault: Pure, Partial or Paltry 
Jack Davies 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Jack Davies, No-Fault: Pure, Partial or Paltry, 21 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361 (1972). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss2/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
No-Fault: Pure, Partial or Paltry
Jack Davies*
At its annual meeting this year the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws gave a first reading to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act (UMVARA). a no-fault auto insurance proposal., With
four three-hour sessions allocated to UMVARA, the Conference spent all of
the first two, most of the third and a bit of the fourth session debating a single
provision of the 7000 word draft.
The Commissioners knew what they were doing; the controversial provision
preserves a limited right to a negligence action in auto accident cases. The
content of that section, and its inclusion or exclusion, determines the essential
question of whether the bill will be pure no-fault, partial no-fault or paltry no-
fault. A no-fault bill is measured by the sections which determine how much
or how little of the fault system will be retained.'
Essentially, the no-fault movement seeks to increase the percentage of auto
insurance premiums which are returned to motorists as first-party, no-fault
benefits and to eliminate or reduce the dollars which go into the third-party,
fault-liability system. 3 In the third-party system a substantial share of the prem-
ium is inevitably used up by investigation costs, lawyers fees, nuisance claim
negotiation and settlement -the frictional costs of the adversary system.4 To the
* B.A., J.D., University of Minnesota; Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law;
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1. The meeting took place at Vail, Colorado, in late August. Conference rules require a second
reading at the 1972 annual meeting for formal promulgation.
2. The goal of the system should be that no recovery for any loss of a type covered
by the applicable required coverage would be permitted in any private action for dam-
ages. The insured victim's sole recourse for benefits for wage loss, medical loss, lost
services, funeral expense and perhaps property damage should be limited to the insured's
required coverage and any additional optional coverages that he has elected to pur-
chase . ..
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 136 (March 1971) (prepared by J. Volpe).
3. "Basically, in a no-fault system the auto owner's own insurance company pays for his costs
for car repairs, injury expenses, or time lost from work; it does so directly, without going through
the often costly legal process of proving one driver or another at fault and then making the at-fault
party's insurer pay." Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 1971, at 16, col. 2.
4. N.Y. DEP'T OF INSURANCE. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 35 (1970).
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full extent possible legal dispute and costs should be removed from the system
of auto accident reparations. A no-fault plan avoids the fact issues of accident
causation and the value of indeterminate damages.5 It thus eliminates substan-
tial legal dispute. The crux of the no-fault battle is lawsuit system vs. insurance
system.'
The Unijorm Act
The UMVARA will likely become the basis for state no-fault legislation unless
Congress preempts the field with a national no-fault law. The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has had a commit-
tee watching the no-fault issue for two years. In September, 1970, with enact-
ment of the Massachusetts no-fault law in headlines, a drafting committee was
named.7 Last spring the Department of Transportation made a substantial
grant to finance the drafting project. Work began at once in a race with the
calendar. The committee faced two deadlines: (1) late August when a no-fault
bill would have to be presented for first consideration at the annual meeting of
the Conference, and (2) December I when a complete though not necessarily
final draft was to be presented to the Department of Transportation(DOT).
5. "We traced each major criticism and defect back to what we think of as the twin cancers of
the present auto insurance system-the principles of a fault concept and indeterminate damages."
Statement by T. Lawrence Jones, President, American Insurance Association Hearings Before The
Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm., Dec. 15, 1969.
6. Three secondary, but controversial, issues have taken substantial amounts of time in deliber-
ations of the committee drafting the UMVARA. They are in the order of political signifance:
(I) How, within the scheme of first party insurance, to reallocate to heavy vehicle owners
appropriate portions of the cost of injury caused by heavy vehicles.
(2) How to coordinate various insurance coverages and compensation systems to avoid double
recovery without legislatively allocating market shares, and
(3) What level of first party coverage should be mandated and what part left for individual
decision through deductibles, limits on monthly income reimbursements, exclusions, etc.
These issues are not discussed further in this article. I am confident the resolution of ihese issues
in the final draft of UMVARA will be realistic and fair.
7. Members of the Committee are: Chairman, Dean Lindsey Cowen, University of Georgia
School of Law; Prof. Jack Davies, William Mitchell College of Law; Tom Downs, Detroit, Michi-
gan; M. King Hill, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland; Prof. Robert E. Keeton, Harvard Law School. Prof.
William A. Kelly, School of Law, University of Kansas; Howard G. Kulp, Jr., Camden, New
Jersey, Kelton S. Lynn, Rapid City, South Dakota; Vincent L. McKusick, Portland, Maine; Fred
Puckett, Ohio Legislative Service Commission; George A. Ranney, Jr., Bureau of the Budget,
Springfield, Illinois; Judge Irving Merrell Strauch, Memphis, Tennessee; Don J. McClenahan,
Boise, Idaho.
Committee Staff are: Project Manager, Robert Bombaugh, Chicago, Illinois; Reporter-
Draftsmen, William Cohen, Stanford University Law School and Roger C. Henderson, University
of Nebraska Law School; Consultant-Dean Richard S. L. Roddis, University of Washington Law
School.
The committee is assisted by an advisory committee which includes lawyers, insurance execu-
tives, professors, government officials, and business representatives.
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The December I deadline has been both met and deferred. As of December
1, four successive drafts had been presented to the DOT, but the DOT and the
NCCUSL have agreed that formal DOT comment upon the conference work
will be directed to one of several drafts to be delivered during the spring of 1972.
The drafting committee will conclude its major efforts by May 1972 with a draft
to be considered for promulgation as a uniform act at the August 1972 meeting
of the NCCUSL. s
After examining no-fault bills from various states the committee and staff
selected the Minnesota bill as the focus for the drafting effort., Eight full days
of committee work plus independent redrafting by the reporters and other staff
members produced a substantially completed bill representing committee con-
sensus in time for first consideration by the NCCUSL.
The proposal went to the floor on August 27 containing a limited retention
of fault liability. To amend the key provisions to provide either pure no-fault,
a watered-down no-fault or any degree of no-fault in between was simple,
however. The bill was drawn to accommodate these amendments and to make
debate on this essential issue nearly inevitable. Since the same format will be
in the final draft, battle over pure. partial or paltry no-fault will undoubtedly
arise in those state legislatures that consider the Uniform Act. It is to be
expected that when opponents cannot defeat a no-fault bill, they will seek a
compromise retaining as much of the liability system as possible.'0 Therefore,
a description of the sections and the amendments considered by the NCCUSL
in August should be enlightening.
The Committee Draft
The key provisions begin with a blanket abolition of tort liability "arising from
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle."" This provision stand-
8. Preliminary drafts are available from the NCCUSL office upon request. The address is 1155
East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637. The DOT grant has been supplemented with a $100,000
grant from the Ford Foundation.
9. See Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-Fault Auto Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REV. 921
(1970).
10. "it was charged this week, by a young Boston lawyer, that American trial lawyers who
often make careers in settling claims under the present 'fault' system-have begun a stealthy
campaign to ruin the insurance reform's chances, or, probably more accurately, to see that reform
bills that emerge in state legislatures obfuscate the real issue involved." Supra note 3, at 16, col. I.
II. SECTION [ I [PARTIAL ABOLITION OF TORT LIABILITY] Tort liability arising from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within this state is abolished except as to:
(a) damages to property other than motor vehicles and their contents;
(b) intentional assault and intentional battery;
(c) damages for noneconomic detriment as permitted by Section [ ] [RESTRICTION
ON RECOVERY FOR NONECONOMIC DETRIMENT] .  ... UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE Ac-
CIDENT REPARATION ACT 5 (Second Tentative Draft, Aug. 24, 1971) [hereinafter cited
as UMVARA].
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ing alone produces pure no-fault. In fact, this abolition produces a bit purer
no-fault than is desired by anyone, so an "except" clause preserves liability for
"intentional assault and battery."
A second "except" preserves negligence liability for damage to store fronts,
traffic signs, lampposts and all other property which does not constitute
"motor vehicles or their contents."'" Neither of the above exceptions received
much floor discussion.
However, the third exception was debated for nine hours. As presented to the
floor, the provision read:
SECTION [ ] [RESTRICTION ON RECOVERY FOR NON-
ECONOMIC DETRIMENT.] A person remains subject to tort
liability for noneconomic detriment' 3 caused by his ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person
has suffered permanent significant loss of body function, including
death, permanent serious disfigurement or an injury resulting in
medical expenses exceeding $5,000. In all such cases, the party
liable is entitled to an exemption reducing such liability in the
amount of $5,000.14
Commissioners resistant to the no-fault concept attacked the first $5,000
figure as too high. "Yes, it is high," was the response, "but most really serious
injuries will become eligible for non economic benefits because they involve
'permanent significant loss of body function.' The $5,000 is only intended to
cover very serious cases where there is a good medical recovery. A lower figure
would bring in too many lawsuits." The committee also argued that a lower
figure would encourage victims to build medical costs artificially to climb over
the threshold.
A commissioner suggested from the floor that medical costs vary so much
12. In a no-fault scheme damage to property other than motor vehicles may be compensated
on the basis of strict liability against the car owner and his insurer or on the basis of fault. The
decision to retain fault and thus leave some of the loss on roadside property instead of imposing
the entire cost on the auto insurance system through strict liability is supported by one commis-
sioner's suggestion that some of the insurance cost should be included in the premiums of the man
who "builds his house by the side of the road." Since driver fault is almost presumed whenever an
auto hits a house, store or sign, the commissioner's decision to stay with fault for damage to
property other than motor vehicles or their contents does not significantly change where costs will
ultimately fall.
13. The term "noneconomic detriment" is a euphemism for "pain and suffering."
14. UMVARA, supra note II, at 6. UMVARA contains at this time one more element of
retained tort which is omitted from this discussion because it is of limited application, indefensible,
and under continuous attack in the drafting committee. It retains an action for income loss exceed-
ing the level of compulsory coverage. This makes the action available only to victims with lost
earnings exceeding approximately $15,000 per year, a group well able to purchase voluntary no-
fault coverage to protect its high standard of living.
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from area to area that a uniform figure nationwide was inappropriate. That
argument carried the day. The $5,000 figure for medical expense was stricken
and the drafting committee was instructed to prepare a comment to guide
legislatures in filling the blank. The compromise insures that in each legislature
considering the bill no-fault opponents will have an opportunity to open the
door to more lawsuits by inserting figures such as $500 or $1000, the lawsuit
thresholds in Massachusetts and Florida respectively."5
The defense of the first $5,000 had been mild, however. The drafting commit-
tee saved its heavy guns to resist an effort to reduce the $5,000 figure in the
last sentence of the section. That sentence provides a $5,000 deduction from
pain and suffering damages awarded in the retained fault lawsuits. When the
exemption was attacked the committee raised a vigorous defense.
Committee members asserted that a lower figure would tempt juries to inflate
verdicts so as to negate the exemption. The $5,000 figure would communicate
to juries and judges the strong policy that all victims were to bear a significant
measure of noneconomic loss without money succor. The high figure preserved
the lawsuit for the serious cases, but cut out the mass of trivia which costs the
auto insurance system billions of dollars."6 With each dollar the figure is low-
ered, the temptation to the claimant and his attorney to give the lawsuit a try
becomes greater. With each reduction in the exemption the nuisance claim value
of auto injuries is increased. The drafting committee asserted that the confer-
ence could tamper with the $5,000 exemption only at grave risk to the no-fault
system. The committee was asked for statistical support for the $5,000 exemp-
tion. It had none because the figure is based on subjective judgment.17 Further-
more, no other figure could be supported statistically, so those who wanted to
reduce the deduction were equally unarmed on the issue.
A compromise was offered from the floor which would retain the $5,000
figure, but put it in brackets to flag it for further consideration at the 1972
NCCUSL annual meeting. In the meantime the brackets would suggest to
legislatures looking at preliminary drafts that the dollar figure represents a
judgment rather than a statistically determined "benchmark" and that legisla-
tures can make independent judgments on the issue if they choose. The compro-
mise was adopted.
Basis br Tort Retention
The retention of even limited tort liability in the Uniform Act should be ex-
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971). FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 71-252, § 8(2).
16. Supra note 4, at 25-30.
17. Its origin is § 4.2(2) of the Keeton-O'Connell bill. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 323 (1965).
1972]
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plained, for the drafting committee is generally committed to the no-fault con-
cept. Why were no-fault opponents provided with a retained tort section which
can serve as a vehicle for their efforts to dilute the potentials of no-fault?
Some compromise within the drafting committee is involved. But the as-
serted, logical basis for retaining tort in serious cases is concern that grievously
injured traffic victims may not be adequately compensated by reimbursement
of economic losses and nothing more. However, providing a method of fair
compensation for noneconomic losses in serious cases is difficult. The American
Insurance Association (AIA) in its initial proposal offered fifty percent of
medical expense as a benefit provided in addition to compensation for economic
loss. " The AIA quickly dropped that part of its plan because the amount of
medical expense often has no correlation with pain, inconvenience or any other
justification for compensation for noneconomic detriment."
The Minnesota bill included a fixed schedule of benefits for "medical impair-
ment."' 0 The schedule approach has not found favor, primarily because of
workmen's compensation experience under which the schedules have become
unreasonably low with the passage of time. Perhaps a schedule approach will
eventually win favor, but the drafting committee for the Uniform Act has
passed it by.
Lacking any other formula for awarding benefits for noneconomic loss, the
committee chose to retain the limited tort action now found in its draft. This
follows the Keeton-O'Connell bill formula. 21 Retention of tort has the advan-
tage of providing no debating points to opponents of no-fault. Tort is familiar,
even if discredited. Tort damages in serious cases provide a handy answer to
the "horrible hypotheticals" used by foes of no-fault to imply that benefits will
be inadequate under first party insurance.2 2
There is another method of providing benefits above economic loss reim-
bursements. It lacks the political advantages of retention of tort, but is honest
and logical. The alternative is to leave the problem of providing compensation
for noneconomic loss to the insurance marketplace by allowing insurance com-
panies and their customers to work out whatever coverage they choose. Volun-
tarily purchased coverage might take the form of a schedule, or a percentage
18. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PRO-
TECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 5 (1968).
19. See Maynes & Williams, Fault or No-Fault?. PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REFORM 84 (1970); Statement ofT. Lawrence Jones, President, Amer-
ican Insurance Association.
20. Supra note 9, at 935-39.
21. Supra note 17.
22. See Simonett & Sargent, The Minnesota Plan: A Responsible Alternative to No-fault
Insurance, 55 MINN. L. REV. 998 (1971).
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of lost earnings, or a percentage of medical expense or, most unlikely, an
indeterminate benefit like today's pain and suffering awards.2a
Legislative Battles
The extent to which fault lawsuits will be retained has been the key issue in each
legislature which has considered a no-fault law and in the succeeding drafts of
the Hart-Magnuson bill in Congress. The extent to which fault is retained
marks the distinction between (I) the pure no-fault bills-American Insurance
Association, Stewart-Rockefeller 2 5 Minnesota proposal'2 latest Hart-
Magnuson draft,27 (2) the partial no-fault bills-Keeton-O'Connell s2 Massa-
chusetts law, 2 Florida law.3 " first Hart bill' and (3) the paltry no-fault
bills-Delaware3 and Illinois 33 laws, the American Mutual Insurance Alliance
bill 3 National Association of Independent Insurers bill.
Some effort has been made to represent that Oregon, Minnesota and South
Dakota have adopted no-fault legislation. Since there is no restriction on auto
negligence lawsuits whatsoever under the legislation adopted in these three
states, the claims are without foundation. Oregon does compel purchase of
some no-fault coverage. Minnesota and South Dakota simply require insur-
ance companies to offer supplemental no-fault coverage along with liability
policies.
Conclusion
There is much room for politically expedient compromise through combining
in a bill various proportions of fault and no-fault. There is little room for
intellectual compromise on the issue. Once one rejects the utility of civil liability
23. Committee Print I, of the Hart-Magnuson bill (S.945, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971)) compels
the offering of optional coverage with pain and suffering benefits measured by the standards of
today's tort system. The price of such coverage, with its inherent inefficiency, makes its widespread
utilization unlikely. Still, this bill would add an unnecessary complexity to the insurance market-
place if it, as adopted, were to require companies to offer an irrational coverage.
24. Supra note 18.
25. Supra note 4.
26.- Supra note 9.
27. S.945, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
28. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965)
29, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971).
30, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 71-252 (West Supp., June 1971).
31. S.4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), 116 CONG. REC. 31,521 (1970).
32. Ch. 98, [1971] Del. Laws 55.
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
34. The National Underwriter (Property and Casualty Insurance Edition), December 18, 1970,
at 1, col. 4.
35. Id.
36. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 731.418, § 743.786 (1971).
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as a deterrent to poor automobile driving, retention of any of the fault system
is demonstrably pointless and expensive.37 The retained tort section of the
UMVARA is so limited that it will add only slightly to auto insurance costs.
Its more serious negative aspects are that it interferes with the development of
a sound first-party coverage compensating for non-economic loss and that it
gives a tactical opening to those who would like to water down no-fault legisla-
tion.
Whatever opponents of no-fault insert as an exception to the abolition of tort
liability shrinks the impact of the no-fault system. In the Uniform Act itself
the opponents have a bridgehead from which to amend the act to expand the
area of retained tort. On the other hand no-fault purists need not accept the
$5,000 deduction from pain and suffering awards as a minimum. If the de-
duction is raised, the bill becomes purer no-fault and a greater proportion of
the no-fault potential will be realized. If liability for noneconomic damages
is eliminated entirely, the bill becomes pure no-fault and will deliver the full
no-fault potential in efficiency and justice.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CAUSALITY, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY
CRASIIES (July 1970) (prepared by D. Klein & J. Waller).
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